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I. Abstract 
The Eurozone economic crisis, which began in 2008, has had far reaching and 
destructive effects on the future of Europe, its trading partners and the global economic 
system as a whole. In order to begin to understand the implications it has had on the 
future of Europe as a whole it is important to look at why different member countries 
suffered such divergent repercussions. This research seeks to explain this divergence by 
focusing on the experiences of Germany and France and comparing them to one another. 
The question to be answered is why has there been such a difference in economic success 
and recovery between the economies of France and Germany since the crisis? The 
ultimate answer to this question is that Germany and France were subject to six factors: 
1) the use of an export -manufacturing development model; 2) the timing and nature of the 
economic reforms implemented by each state; 3) the orientation of the countries policies 
being in favor of national or Union interests; 4) the economic and political status of each 
state within the region; 5) the identity of major export partners; 6) the amount of capital 
flow into the state. Using both quantitative and qualitative data to study these factors we 
fmd not only the reasons behind Germany's economic success, but also some of the 
potential future possibilities of the Eurozone and of European integration plans as a 
whole. 
II. Introduction 
In early 2007 the United States entered the so called "subprime crisis". The 
inability of subprime mortgage holders to pay their bills began a domino effect of 
bankruptcy and credit crises that would ultimately lead to the collapse of the "housing 
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bubble" by the end of2008. As these subprime mortgages had been sold by investment 
banks to private banks, businesses and individuals around the world as subprime backed 
securities the crisis spread. What would come to be known as the 'global economic 
crisis' would hit the European Union in early 2008 and by halfway through the year 
credit crises were in full swing both in the US and Europe'. Governments scrambled to 
support collapsing financial institutions and protect investors through bailouts and capital 
lending, but these efforts were not enough to stop the spiral as some of the biggest 
investment firms and banks in the Western world write off billions of dollars-worth of 
losses. 
Subprime, banking, financial, credit, sovereign debt, economic ... regardless of 
which is used the late 2000s saw all of them followed by the same word: crisis. Thus was 
how a century that was once viewed with so much promise began with a time of 
instability and economic and political strife. In the EU the economies of the smaller 
states oflreland, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy folded sunk by high unemployment, 
government deficits and public debt. These countries would be the hardest hit by the 
crisis, but they were not alone as the regions' major economies, particularly those of 
Germany, France and Netherlands, struggled to keep both their national economies and 
the European single market a float. However, the anomaly in this piece of history is not 
the story of the majority, but of the outlier. 
The European Union and Eurozone anomaly in this crisis is Germany. 
Historically one of the major economies of continental Europe it was one of the founding 
members of the European Union and the single-market Eurozone and has had strong 
1Lybeck, Johan A .. A Global History of the Financial Crash of 2007-10. Cambridge,: Cambridge UP, 2011. 
Print. 
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economic ties with France, the other major continental economy, since the end of the 
Second World War in 1945. Yet by 2010 Germany's GDP growth rate had gone from its 
all-time lowest rate2 of -6.80% in the second quarter of2009 to growth rates of over 2%3• 
This significant positive economic growth has persisted and brought with it a decrease in 
unemployment and the stabilization of the national financial system. All the while 
recovery has remained sluggish and limited in France and throughout the rest of the 
Eurozone. 
Looking more closely at some chief economic indicators we can see how different 
the realities are for these two states. France saw its record low by way of GDP growth in 
the first quarter of 2009, when it hit -1.70%. It actually began recovering growth in late 
2009, however though it has largely maintained positive growth rates since, GDP growth 
has never reached even as high as 2%45 . Unemployment rates also differ wildly between 
the two countries, for in France they began increasing in 2007 and is now over 10%6, 
while in Germany the unemployment rate started off high in 2007 at close to 10% and has 
continued to drop to around 5%7• The percentage of government debt to GDP is also 
quite telling, because though Germany's current percentage is fairly high at around 81% 
2 This refers to the all-time lowest growth rate from 1978 to 2013. 
3
"Germany GDP Annual Growth Rate." TRADING ECONOMICS. Trading Economics, 2013. Web. 13 Mar. 
2014. <http://www. tradingecono mics.com/germ any I gd p-growth-a n n ua I>. 
4 
"France GDP Growth Rate." TRADING ECONOMICS. Trading Economics, 2013. Web. 13 Mar. 2014. 
<http://www. trad ingeco nom ics.com/fra nee/ gd p-growth>. 
5 This refers to the all-time lowest growth rate from 1978 to 2013. 
6
"France:Unemployment Rate." TRADING ECONOMICS. Trading Economics, 2013. Web.13 Mar. 2014. 
<http://www. tradi ngeconom ics.com/france/ unemployment -rate>. 
7 Germany:Unemployment Rate." TRADING ECONOMICS. Trading Economics, 2013. Web.13 Mar. 2014 
. <http://www. tradingeco nom ics.com/germ any /unemployment -rate>. 
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in 20138 and dropping as compared to France whose percentage was around 90% in 2013 
and still increasing9. 
Thus the question to be investigated in this paper is: why has there been such a 
difference in economic success and recovery between the economies of France and 
Germany since the crisis? 
III. Literature Review 
Theories of German Economic 'Success' 
In this literature review we will analyze some of the primary theories behind 
Germany's unequaled, within Europe at least, economic success during the economic 
crisis. We will look at the effect of following an export and manufacturing oriented 
model towards development as well as looking at how German policies differ from those 
of France. These works will consequently be summarized and compared with one 
another. 
Our first source is "A Global Economic Crisis?" by Nicola Phillips. This article 
provides a perspective on the 2008 economic crisis and Germany's role in it Phillips 
focuses on the fact that the global economic crisis started in the United States and 
Europe, and for the most part its repercussions have been restricted to those regions. 
Inversely, emerging economies like China, Brazil and India have seen remarkable growth 
and increased global economic influence during the crisis period. However, since the 
height of the crisis in 2009, even these economies have begun to falter. Brazil has been 
8 Germany:Government Debt to GDP." TRADING ECONOMICS. Trading Economics, 2013. Web.13 Mar. 
2014. <http:/ /www.tradingeconomics.com/germany/government-debt-to-gdp>. 
9 France:Government Debt to GDP." TRADING ECONOMICS. Trading Economics, 2013. Web.13 Mar. 2014. 
<http://www. trad ingeconom ics.com/F ra nce/governm e nt -debt -to-gdp>. 
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the hardest hit so far but even the Chinese economy has begun to slow. This is indicated 
by a sharp decline in China's once flourishing manufacturing sector and a general 
downgrade in growth estimates for 2012 and 2013 (this article was written in December 
2012)10• The author disagrees with claims that these are signs of 'China's Great Slow-
down'. Instead she sees them as merely the result of losing so much in trade from the 
devastated Europe and United States economies, and there were indications as early as 
October 2012 that the Chinese economy was beginning to recover. 
As much as China is reliant on countries like the United States for the sale of their 
goods and the growth of their economy, commodity exporters like Germany, Japan and 
Brazil are dependent on sales to the Chinese economy for their growth. However, the 
article predicts that China's growth will become far less dependent on commodity 
imports in the coming years, and this would have serious repercussions for these 
commodity exporters. Still, it is argued that so long as commodity exporters have a 
diversified group of trading partners the loss of China will be less catastrophic, though it 
will most certainly impact their economies. 
The article argues that there are thus three major reasons why emerging 
economies have not been as badly hit as other groups. Firstly, as has already been 
discussed, so long as the US trade deficit continues to increase, so too will these countries 
continue to grow. Secondly, although these countries do tend to rely heavily on exports 
for economic growth, their economic models are fairly diversified and thus the export 
economy is not their sole foundation. In fact these countries tend to have large domestic 
markets and have focused on expansion of domestic demand and consumption. In China, 
10 Phillips, Nicola. "A 'Global' Economic Crisis?" Political Insight 3.3 (2012): 24-27. Wiley Online Library. 
VVeb. 14Jan. 2014. 
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private domestic consumption has been calculated to account for as much as half of total 
GDP. The third and fmal factor, as Dr. Phillips sees it, is inflation and currency pressure. 
These financial complications if not handled properly can result in economic downturn as 
has happened to Brazil. 
China however has largely managed to avoid being negatively impacted by these 
pressures by employing policies like currency manipulation and anti-inflation-based 
economic controls on certain industries. These policies have insulated China but made it 
harder for other countries to recover economically. Thus, to a high degree, having 
greater independent control over ones financial sector and being insulated from major 
fmancial centers and the International Monetary Fund, as well as decreasing ones reliance 
on the US dollar as a major trading currency, has helped these countries keep up their 
growth rates and weather the economic crisis. Likewise the decrease in power and 
influence of the EU, US and UK has enabled the power and influence of emerging 
markets to increase and thus these countries have been freer to implement economic 
changes so as to protect themselves from the same kind of economic turmoil that the 
West has seen.11 
"Germany: Europe's China" by Paul Dobrescu and Malina Ciocea focuses on 
why Germany, like China, has seen economic growth and advancement during the 
economic crisis. The authors argue that China and Germany have benefited the most 
from the crisis because their development models have been proven successful. Both 
models focus on manufacturing, with China having made itself into the world's factory 
and Germany having made itself Europe's, and both have focused on exports. In fact, as 
of June 2013 when the article was written China and Germany were first and second in 
11 Phillips 24·27. 
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the world for export volume. The last key factor is that both countries focused on their 
own domestic development12 • To support this view the authors focus on six key factors, 
which will be subsequently discussed. 
The first element is the growth of German power and influence in Europe, the 
authors perceive that the most important decisions are now made in Berlin. This shift, 
though apparently helped by the crisis, is largely a reflection of Germany's rise in power 
and prestige over the last several years. It is also key that France has historically been 
Germany's only real competitor; however Dobrescu and Ciocea conclude that France is 
no longer a real threat to German authority. Additionally Germany has grown weary of 
the "rulebreaking and fiscal incontinence elsewhere in Europe" and thus has been 
increasingly taking over the creation and implementation of Eurozone policies13 • These 
policy decisions are focused on making Europe more "German" by way of the running of 
institutions. The authors also argue that German reunification in the early 90's also 
helped encourage Germany to think more "self-centeredly" about how things in Europe 
should be run. 
The second regards the German policy for production. As the authors see it, 
Germany could not compete with the United States by way of widespread innovation so 
instead it focused on key industries in which it has a tradition of success and 
competitiveness. This has worked to Germany's advantage, because increases in labor 
productivity are not dependent on innovation alone. The article gives the statistic that the 
average growth in US labor productivity has been less than 1.5% from 2004 through 
12 Dobrescu, Paul, and Malina Ciocea. 1111Germany: Europe's China"." Romanian Journal of European Affairs 
13.2 (2013): 49-66. Questia. Web. 12 Feb. 2014. 
13 1bid 
.. 
Hill: The Eurozone Economic Crisis and the Divergent Paths of Unity 10 
2012.14 Consequently, if innovation cannot do the job of stimulating greater productivity 
and if, as former US Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan once said, a decrease in 
productivity leads to economic crisis, , then we must look to classical instruments for 
creating productivity in order to avert disaster15 . Such classical instruments are things 
like "hard work, concentration, identification of a niche or a branch which allows 
performance" 16. Thus we see that the development equation has changed to one focused 
on discipline and management, which are· also the classical advantages of both Germany 
and China. 
The third element, that of a focus on domestic devdopment over the development 
of the Union, is a policy, which the authors say, Germany began to implement in the 
1990's. They started down this path as a result of divergent views with France on how 
the fiscal policy of the Union should be handled. In 1994 Germany hoped to implement 
policies that would unifY the fiscal policies of the Union's rnembers, however France 
refused this proposal and thus, the authors argue, German elites began looking at what 
was strategically needed to develop the states domestic economic potential17. The 
authors also argue that the reason that Germany's idea of so called "fiscal federalism" 
was refused, was first because Germany sought to establish ''Bundesbank -style principles 
operating independently of governments to protect Europe from inflation," while France 
wanted, "European politicians to protect high-growth policies from external monetary 
disruption"18• 
14 1bid 
15 1bid 
16 1bid 
17 1bid 
18 1bid 
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Another piece of this puzzle is the author's conclusion that France and the other 
states of the European Union were focused on restraining Germany through thoroughly 
integrating it with European structures. Germany on the other hand focused on its own 
development and it did so largely, because of the unique historical context in which it 
exists. The German economy started to falter in the 90's as a result of the strain of trying 
to assimilate the economically backward German Democratic Republic. This seeming 
disadvantage helped encourage domestic development and brought about the economic 
success that has characterized Germany since the mid-2000s. Therefore it must be 
concluded that the only way for France to turn around the economic decline that they 
have been going through during the 2000's is to follow the German example and quickly 
modernize its economy iii pursuit of greater market competitiveness. 
The fourth element, that of Germany's success at establishing its authority over 
the Eurozone' s financial institutions details another German-EU relationship that began 
prior to the 2008 crisis. Apparently during the negotiations that resulted in the Maastricht 
Treaty creating the European Union, Germany made their cooperation contingent on the 
incorporation of certain Bundesbauk-style fiscal policies. These included a strongly 
independent European central batik with a focus on eliminating inflation. Germany also 
refused to accept provisions that would "allow for fiscal transfers or bailouts," among 
member states. In addition to being heaped with strict German-style regulations, the 
Treaty also established the European Central Batik in the German city of Fraukfurt. This 
has led to the suggestion that the Euro is in fact "the new European Deutsch-Mark"19. 
19 Official currency of Western- and later Reunified- Germany from 1948 till1999 when it was replaced by 
the Euro. 
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The authors subsequently make assertions for the predominance of political 
motivations in the creation of the Euro-currency in what was perhaps too early of a stage 
in the Unions development process. These include the belief that one of the primary 
goals of both the single currency and the Union itself was to hinder Germany. The 
authors characterize this by saying, "Germany's reunification in the early 90s announced 
the rise of the Union's first economic power [Germany]. France and Europe in its 
entirety were preoccupied with Germany's evolution and dominance" 20· Another cited 
political reason for the single currencies creation was to assist with the creation of the 
Union itself. However, it is argued that by not implementing measures to create 
economic cohesion between states with highly varied degrees of economic performance, 
the implementation of the single .currency both increased and created gaps between the 
states. Likewise these political initiatives have assisted Germany in its acquisition of 
economic power in the region, first by putting it in control of financial institutions and 
then by causing other states to be hindered and distracted by objectives other than their 
own economic development. 
Dobrescu and Ciocea's fifth element is that Germany focused on industry and. 
manufacturing instead of services, which has been the focus of the French economy for 
many years. Manufacturing is particularly important, because it acts as, "a driver of 
productivity growth, innovation and trade," and it, "typically accounts for the largest 
share of an economy's foreign trade'm. A study cited in the article even suggests that as 
much as 70% of the exports from major advanced and developing economies come from 
20 Dobrescu, Paul, and Malina Ciocea 49-66. 
21 lbid 
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manufacturing22. To excel in the area of exports requires good organization and internal 
performance capabilities. Subsequently, Germany is one of the top fifteen manufacturing 
nations on the planet and is also the world's second largest exporter after China23 • This is 
tied to Germany's focus on internal modernization, increasing competitiveness and on 
targeting particular sectors in which they had an advantage. Another piece of this is the 
issue of trade deficits, which have increased greatly over the last several years. France in 
particular has had large deficits with both China and other European states during the 
2000s and thus has had to borrow money in order to maintain import levels. However, 
because Germany has had annual trade surpluses during this period, which means it does 
not have to borrow money in order to import what it needs. This has put Germany at a 
great advantage over France and has resulted from the German focus on manufacturing 
and exports. 
Given the afore-mentioned importance of reform and modernization in eco..nomic 
growth, this factor is also the authors' sixth and final element. They are thought to have 
played a crucial role in establishing Germany's current economic success and one of the 
key pieces of reform legislation is the so called "Agenda 201 0" or "Hartz Reforms", 
which was launched by former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in 200324. "Agenda 2010" 
focused on making changes to the state's welfare system in order to both make it more 
economical and more modern. This action was taken so as to combat the economic 
downturn that followed reunification and it was done in order to create a more 
competitive economic and social program. These changes ultimately allowed for a 
quicker German recovery by permitting Germany to enter a brief period of austerity 
22 1bid 
23 1bid 
24 1bid 
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during which it devaluated its currency in order to increase exports to Europe and abroad. · 
Therefore Germany's success is attributed to the fact that it perceived the economy and 
the welfare state as inseparable parts of the achievement of development and 
moderpization. Among these reforms is the "short prog>am", which focused on, among 
other things, decreasing unemployment by decreasing working hours and avoiding 
having workers made redundant. France on the other hand did not implement radical 
reforms to the labor market. Instead France waited until after the 2008 crisis had begun 
and its economy had begun to flounder under increased public debt, because its social 
welfare system had not undergone anything like Getmany's cost-effective, modernization 
process yet. 
The article ultimately argues that Germany is in the perfect position for claiming a 
real hegemonic leadership position in Europe. However social problems like loss of 
population and few competitive universities, stand in·GermRny's way of achieving this 
goal. Becoming an official regional leader is also incumbent on the continued success of 
its manufacturing and export oriented development model. 
Dobrescu and Ciocea as well as Phillips all agree that there are similarities 
between China and Germany's development models. They both focus on exports as well 
as manufacturing and they both have surplus balances of trade. Phillips also describes 
slightly the relationship that exists between Germany and China, but the analysis focuses 
mostly on Germany's dependence on China. Dobrescu and Ciocea on the other hand 
make reference to the fact that unlike the EU and US, which have consistently had trade 
deficits; in 2012 Germany had a trade surplus with China of $17 billion. However, an 
article by Parello-Flesner and Kundnani titled "China and Germany: a new special 
Hill: The Eurozone Economic Crisis and the Divergent Paths of Unity. 15 
relationship?" seeks· to clarifY the German-China relationship25• The article, though brief, 
states that due to a need by Germany and China for markets and technology respectively, 
these countries sought closer economic relations in 2008 in order to promote growth in 
the face of the economic downturn. The authors argue that China is pmiicularly 
interested in increased trade with Germany not only for general economic reasons but 
because they see it as the way to achieve increased German dependence on them. With 
Germany being the cunent power in Europe and the potential future leader of a "German 
Europe", a Germany dependent on China for economic survival could pressure the EU to 
follow policies favorable to China26. It is for this reason that, although the authors see 
this as highly beneficial relationship for China, they also believe it could undermine 
European strategic interests in the areas of foreign policy, human rights and climate 
change. The authors also state their view that the emerging EU-China relationship should 
be further cultivated and a European strategic partnership with China shou)d be 
established. They should do this by helping Germany to create rules and guidelines for 
filture trade deals and by working out a joint-EU relationship with China in order to allow 
the greater involvement ofEU institutions27• 
Our next source is "Germany's Quest for a New EU Industrial Policy: Why it is 
Failing" by Mitchell P. Smith. Smith focuses on the question of why Germany has failed 
to gain headway in implementing its industrial policy views. During the early 2000s, 
Chancellor Schroeder expressed the view that, "that efforts by the European Union to 
promote growth and jobs neglected manufacturing industry and failed to take sufficient 
25 Parello-Piesner, Jonas, and Hans Kundnani. "China and Germany: A New Special Relationship?" 
European Council on Foreign Relations. ECFR.eu, n.d. Web. 20 Mar. 2014. 
<http:/ I ecfr.eu/ content/ entry /China_ and_ Germ any_ a_ new _speci al_re I ationship>. 
26 Dobrescu, Paul, and Malina Ciocea 49-66. 
27 Parello-Piesner, Jonas, and Hans Kundnani. 
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account of the external environment in which European indushy operates"28• However 
these views were largely ignored by the greater European community, due in large part to 
the fact that the Union established its industrial policy during the 1980's and 90's when 
the German industrial model had begun to wane. For this reason Germany was not seen 
as a model for how best to implement industrial policy. Smith, however, also identifies 
another reason that the German perspective continues to be ignored. This is termed "path 
dependency" or the committal of the European integration program to support the single 
market system through a policy of' competitiveness through competition'29 • 
'Competitiveness through competition' comes from the belief that by eliminating all 
policy barriers to competition within the Union the industrial sector will become more 
competitive and will become capable of competing on the global market. This European 
policy, which follows economic liberal ideology, has led to a shift towards similar 
policies by national governments and Smith argues that this has led to state 'hardening' 30. 
State hardening is identified in the European context as the development by the state into 
an economic entity that does not have to adhere to the particular interests of factions 
within their own state. The political riskiness of state hardening helps to enforce the 
government's reluctance to change to different policies both at the Union and national 
levels. Thus there are fewer governmental controls over the industrial sectors of many 
European countries. Germany on the other hand focused on the creation of global 
competitiveness through subsidizing domestic industries as well as enacting other 
protectionist policies. 
28 Smith, Mitchell P. "Germany's Quest for a New EU Industrial Policy: Why It Is failing." German Politics 
14.3 (2005): 315-31. Taylor and Francis Online. Web. 10 Jan. 2014. 
29 1bid 
30 Ibid 
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Smith supports Dobrescu and Ciocea's conclusions that Germany was used as the 
model for the Union's monetary policy, however Smith does not think that this has given 
Germany an abundance of power in Europe. He argues that German power in Europe, 
"consists of indirect institutional power rather than hegemonic power; derives from 
Germany's role as an example of policy success; and is a product of institutional 
isomorphism between German federalism and the structure of the EU"31 . Thus the extent 
of Germany's power is its ability to influence those institutions that have always had a 
more German-looking policy path. However, where the other European institutions are 
concerned Germany must fight an up-hill battle against the simple inertia of policies 
decisions that it was not considered an expert on. 
Another area that was discussed in both of these articles is that the EU failed to 
create 'social Europe' policies32• When they were first striving to build the institutions of 
the EU in the late 90's and early 2000's the German social market economy was their 
model. However, Smith argues that the social elements of the model were neverreally 
developed after the liberal economic policies were given predominance. The EU' s social 
programs system thus tries to combine the goal of maximizing economic efficiency with 
those of job creation and flexibility in the labor force for older workers. 
Our final source that of"Germany and Ireland Unemployment Compared, or Why 
Germany Profited from the World Economic Crisis" by Ralf Jeremias gives us an entirely 
different perspective on Germany and the economic crisis. This article looks at Germany 
as it compares to Ireland, one of the smaller Eurozone member countries that was also 
one of the first to feel the effects of the economic downturn. Jeremias argues that it was 
31 1bid 
32 Smith 315-31. 
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not Germany's policy decisions but other economic factors like capital flow and 
demography that led to Germany's comparative economic success33 • Key to.this is the 
fact that prior to 2008 Germany had low economic growth rates, increasing · 
unemployment and a high level of govermnent regulation over its economy. Conversely, 
smaller states like Ireland had high economic growth rates, falling unemployment rates 
and a low level of govermnent regulation. Thus capital flowed in the early 2000s out of 
Germany and into these states where it was more profitable for businesses to set up shop. 
However the lack of govermnent regulation over the financial sector in Ireland led to 
vulnerability and created a "housing bubble" and like in the United States when this 
bubble burst it sent the fmancial sector and then the whole economy into crisis34• 
With the economy in turmoil it was no longer for investors to remain in these 
smaller states and thus capital flowed back to its source in Germany. This capital flow 
was thus invested in research and development and lead to job creation andJewBr 
unemployment in Germany. Jeremias also concludes that it was increased capital flow 
and not a focus on manufacturing and exports that lead to Germany's success after 2008. 
This view opposes those of both Dobrescu and Ciocea and Phillips, because it paints the 
picture of pre-crisis Germany as one where Germany was still one of the major exporter 
countries on the planet and yet German workers had to accept sinking wages in a 
generally poor economic situation. Jeremias further argues that this repression of wages 
on the part of the German govermnent was a direct result of the policies enacted both 
prior to and in conjunction with Chancellor Schroeder's "Agenda 2010". They have 
subsequently also resulted in an increase in income inequality that has continued to grow 
33 Jeremias, Rail. "Germany And Ireland Unemployment Compared, Or Why Germany Profited From The 
World Economic Crisis." Working USA 15.2 (2012): 233-65. Wiley Online Library. Web. 12 Feb. 2014. 
34 1bid 
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over the last two decades. Jeremias also points to the Hartz IV reforms35 and it's so 
called "one-Euro jobs" program, as measures that have been put in place to unrealistically 
decrease the unemployment rate36• These reforms were intended, among other tbings, to 
provide increased unemployment benefits in exchange for work for government run 
charities. However, tbe result of the program has been to stigmatize long·time 
unemployed workers as "hard to employ" and tbus as less desirable workers37• It has also 
helped decrease the unemployment rate, because when these unemployed: workers work 
more than I 5 hours per week in these "one-Euro jobs" they are considered employed38 • 
One final point that Jeremias makes to support his conclusions tbat it was the 
economic situation brought on by the crisis and not governmental policies tbat helped 
Germany is the demography of the employed. Jeremias cites that a majority of the 
reduction in the unemployment rate comes from the retirement and subsequent removal 
of workers from the labor force. App3Iently statistics from th~ German Federal 
Statistical Office show that the number of retirees since 20 I 0 has increased and Jeremias 
gives tbe example that, "If in May 2011 there were about 276,000 fewer unemployed 
persons than in May 2010 ... tbere are 200,000 fewer unemployable [retired] persons each 
year"39• Therefore perhaps the best conclusion that can be gleaned from Jeremias 
analysis is that Germany appears to be doing better, and to some degree is actually doing 
better, more because most of the other states in the Union are doing terribly and are thus 
buoying its economy by allowing it to collect the stray investors no longer able to engage 
in most of the EU at a profit. 
35 The last installment of "Agenda 2010", which went into effect at the start of 2005. 
36 /bid 
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These theories provide us with the building blocks of our analysis of how the 
German and French economies have grown to differ so wildly from one another during 
the relatively short period of the crisis. They make it clear that there are both structural 
and policy differences between the two states. However, there are many questions left 
unanswered as relating to our research question. We cannot yet be sure if Germany's 
success is a result of effective policy reforms, its economic model or, as Jeremias would 
see it, the result ofthe economic circumstances in the other EU states. 
IV. Research Desi~;n 
My original research question address.ed why the German economy has made a 
stronger recovery faster than its French counterpart since the start of the European 
fmancial crisis. After analyzing some of the theories cormected with my question my 
hypothesis is that the Gennan economy has succeeded, because it focused on an export 
and manufacturing based model for development and has implemented policies that are 
unique in the Eurozone; In order to answer this question and analyze the validity of my 
hypothesis I will make a normative and theoretical study of the crisis using library and 
archival research. Additionally I will use both qualitative, from scholarly articles and 
journals like German Politics and others and quantitative data in the form of economic 
data from such sources as the Observatory of Economic Complexity, the World Bank, 
Trading Economics, OECD, and indexmundi. By way of quantitative data we will 
particularly look at the real annual GDP growth rates of Germany and France, their 
unemployment rates and both export destination countries and annual export totals 
throughout the crisis period. In order to prove my hypothesis correct I would have to find 
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the export-manufacturing model and German policy reforms to be the most significant 
factors in Gennany's unexpected economic success. 
V. Findings 
The Eurozone Economic Crisis and the Divergent Paths of Unity 
In order to explain Germany's · ec·onomic success we will begin by looking at the 
two factors that were given predominance in my hypothesis and which I initially believed 
were the primary sources of Germany' economic success. These factors are Germany's 
manufacturing-export development model and its internal economic policies. 
i. Manufacturing-Export Development Model 
The manufacturing-export development model is not unique to "Germany. It has 
betm used to great success by other states, most notably China, in order tQ achieve 
sustained economic growth. With China as our comparison it would be easy to conclude 
that this model is at the heart of Germany's success, however the problem comes when 
we compare Germany to France. The problem is that both of these states are fairly major 
exporters. As Dobrescu and Ciocea pointed out Germany was second only to China in 
export volume as Df mid-2013. It is particularly successful in the export of chemicals, 
phmmaceuticals and machinery. France on the other hand is one of the largest exporters 
of lUXlliJ' goods and agricultural products ih the world .. There is of course a difference in 
scale. For Germany exports as of2012 made-up roughly 52%40 of GDP and amounted to 
40 
"Exports of Goods and Services(% of GDP)."Data. The World Bank Grou[!, 2014. Web. 12 Mar. 2014. 
<http:/ I data. world bank.org/i n dicator /N E. EXP .G N FS.ZS>. 
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$1.46 trillion dollars41 where as in France exports in 2012 made-up only· about 27% of 
GDP42 and amounted to $567 .I billion dollars43 • Thus it is clear that Germany dedicates 
and benefits a great deal more from exports than France. Still, looking at the data 
provided by the statistical database, Trading Economics, we can see that it was not 
always the case that Germany received so much more than France from exports. 
In fact looking at a statistical comparison of the export volume, of the two states 
from January 2006 to January 2014 we can observe that France consistently received 
more than Germany until, after volume plummeted in 2009, 2010 when Germany began 
to overtake their neighbor and it has continued to consistently have a higher export 
volume ever since44• This suggests that Phillips and Dobrescu and Ciocea are correct and 
that a focus on exports is important to Germany's success in quicidy recovering from the 
crisis. However the pronounced change in the relationship between the countries' export 
volumes after the most serious part of the European financial Grisis, shows..that exports 
cannot be the only factor. Thus the question is what is this other factor and why is 2010 
seemingly the starting point for this change. Therefore let us look at the other indicator 
suggested by our hypothesis, that of internal economic policies. 
ii. Timing and Nature of Economic Reforms 
Both the article by Dobrescu and Ciocea and that of Smith speak positively about 
German economic reforms as the vehicle by which Germany saved itself from the trauma 
41 
"France vs. Germany."lndexmundi. lndexmundi, 2013. Web. 14 Apr. 2014. 
<http:/ lwww .indexm u nd i.comlfactbookl com pare/france .germany I econ amy>. 
42 
"Exports of Goods and Services(% of GDP)." 
43 
"France vs. Germany." 
M . . 
"Germany Exports." TRADING ECONOMICS. TRADING ECONOMICS, Feb. 2014. Web. 12 Mar. 2014. 
<http:/ lwww. tradingeconom ics.comlgermany I exports>. 
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of the economic crisis, yet we must ask the extent to which this is true. ·It ali began in the 
1990's with the long awaited reunification of the two halves of Germany. Along with the 
fanfare and jubilation this historic event also brought great economic worries for the new 
state. Western Germany had a highly developed and flourishing economy while the 
former-Soviet Bloc Eastern Getmany had developed little in the past forty years. Thus 
the new German state inherited a consequent nightmare whereby their economic stability 
was dependent on dragging the economy of the East into the modem age. So the 
government went to work supplying subsidies and massive capital inflows in order to 
help eastern growth. However, this economic strain proved too much and as a result the 
economy went into a downturn during the early 2000s. During this period economic 
growth stagnated and unemployment steadily increased from 7.5% to over 10% between 
2000 and 2005. Real GDP growth also fell from 3.2% to -0.2% in 2003 only to rise again 
and stay below 2% until 200645 •. "Agenda 201 0" also known as the 'Hartz Reforms', 
which were implemented between 2003 and 2005 by than Chancellor Schroeder46, were 
introduce.d in order to combat these problems. 
The "Agenda 2010" reforms particularly focused on reducing government funded 
health care benefits, cutting taxes, overhauling the pension system and restructuring labor 
regulations 47. The health reforms alone would increase the amount of health care costs 
shouldered by the German people by requiring, among other things, that citizens pay co-
45 (2009), "Country statistical profile: Germany", Country statistical profiles: Key tables from OECD. 
doi: 10.1787/20752288-2009-table-deu. 06 Apr. 2009. Web. 15 Apr. 2014. <http://www.oecd-
ilibrary .erg/ economics/country-statistical-profile-germany- 2009 _ 2075 2288-2009-tabl e-d eu>. 
46 Knight, Ben. '"Hartz Reforms': How a Benefits 5hakeup Changed Germany."Theguardian.com. 
Guardian News and Media. 01 Jan. 2013. Web. 20 Mar. 2014. 
<http://www. thegua rdi an. com/ com m entisfree/2013/ja n/01 
/germany-hartz-reforms-inequality>. 
47 
"A Quick Guide To 'Agenda 2010' I Germany I DW.DE 117.10.2003." OW.OE.Deutsche Welle. 17 Oct. 
2013. Web. 14 Mar. 2014. <http:/ /www.dw.de/a-quick-guide-to-agenda-2010/a-988374-l>. 
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pays for doctors' visits48. Regarding the labor market, the reforms shortened the period 
during which someone can receive unemployment benefits, reorganized the Federal 
Labor Office into the equivalent of a govermnent-run placement agency; which is now 
known as the Federal Job Agency, and it combines unemployment and welfare benefits 
together and sets caps on how much govermnent aid an unemployed person qan receive 
in order to encourage them to seek employment49• Reforms to the tax system decreased 
taxation on the poorest and richest segments of society while increasing the taxes placed 
on businesses and extending them to freelancers, doctors and lawyers who were not 
previously taxed. These tax changes were joined with a cut in federal subsidies and the 
privatization of govermnent -owned properties. The intention was to encourage consumer 
spending and to decrease govermnent deficits at the local and state levels through the 
increase in tax revenues. Yet another part of these reforms issued an increase in the 
retirement age, a decrease in .pensions as a perc'"ntage of the workers previously held 
income and a decrease in costly requirements for being able to practice in a skil)(;d trade 
as a master craftsman 5°. Still other reforms were implemented in 2008 and 2009 with a 
focus on stabilization and economic stimulus, and these were followed up with tax cuts in 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel's second term5152• 
Looking at available economic data it is clear that the ref01ms supported a 
decrease in cyclical unemployment and coincided with an increase in economic growth. 
48 1bid 
49 Ibid 
50 Ibid 
51 
"France vs. Germany."lndexmundi. lndexmundi, 2013. Web. 14 Apr. 2014. 
<http://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/cornpare/france.germany/economy>. 
52 A member of the Christian Democratic Union party, Chancellor Angela Merkel has been "elected for 
three terms as Chancellor. The first was from 2005-2009, when she took over from Chancellor Gerhard 
Schro<'n.er, her second term was from 2009-2013, and she was just elected to her third term, which 
extend from 2013-2017. 
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Looking at stati$tics from the OECD database we can see that as of2005, when the last of 
the Hartz reforms went into action, the unemployment rate was over 10%.afterhaving 
risen steadily over the previous five years. However, after the reforms were implemented 
the unemployment rate began to drop and has continued to drop with the exception ofin 
2009 when, at the height of the economic crisis, the rate rose a few tenths of a percent 
again. The current rafe is roughly 5%. The credit for this drop in unemployment to pre-
2000 lows is largely given to the Hartz reforms. However, criticisms are also leveled that 
these reforms mandated low unemployment rates by forcing workers to take low-paying 
part-time jobs with limited job security, health benefits, and hours. Similarly, these 
reforms are also seen as having promoted an increase in the wage gap and inequality, as 
well as causing a strong divergence between real wage and real GDP per capita 53. 
An April20 12 OECD report stated that, "Disposable income growth has been 
very low ... in Germ_any ... in_particular in the lower deciles. Thi~ is especislly evident 
from the mid-1990s to 2008 when 30% of the poorest Germans actually had negative real 
income growth"54. Additionally the report concluded that this inequality has established 
Germany as, " ... the only cmmtry [in the EU] that has seen an increase in labor earnings 
inequality from the mid-1990s to the 2000s"55 The genuine constitutionality of these 
reforms has also been called into question in recent years. German courts in Berlin and 
elsewhere have concluded that the Hartz IV payment amount for the unemployed is not 
53 Krebs, Tom, and Martin Sheffel. 11German Labor Reforms: Unpopular Success."German Labour 
Reforms: Unpopular Success. VOX, 20 Sept. 2013. Web. 18 Mar. 2014. 
<http://www.voxeu.org/article/german-labour-reforms-unpopular-success>. 
54 Fredriksen, Kaja B. Income Inequality in the European Union Economics Department Working Papers No. 
952. Rep. no. ECO/WKP(2012)29. OECD, 16 Apr. 2012. Web. 20 Mar. 2014. 
<http:/ /search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP(2012)29&doclanguage 
=En>. . ~ 
55 Ibid 
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high enough to allow for adherence to the Constitutional requirement of promoting the 
inviolability of"human dignity"56. 
Still other scholars believe that, although the Hartz reforms affect the 
unemployment rate, they did not create the circumstance of Germany's economic growth. 
This growth came instead as a result of the threat of outsourcing to Eastern and Central 
European states after the fall of the Soviet Union. Faced with the potential for a 
catastrophic loss of industrial sector jobs, Germans were forced to change the power 
relationship between ·unions, workers and the firms with which they are affiliated. In 
short the power of unions and collective bargaining was greatly limited moving from 
national, regional and industry-level negotiations to negotiations directly between 
employees and employers. This made salaries more "flexible" and responsive to changes 
in the global market and the economy, which meant that wages and the cost of 
manufacturing goods in Gennany both dropped57• These changes were implementer! in 
the early 1990's and began the process of"wagemoderation", which, it is argued, is a -
process that was sped up by the "Agenda 2010" reforms58. However the pattern of real 
GDP growth does net point to either the Hartz refmms or earlier reforms in collective 
bargaining conditions as the cause of German economic growth and recovery. 
Real GDP like unemployment did begin to improve after the full implementation 
of the Hartz reforms staying at around 3% in 2006 and 2007. Both indicators also 
decreased in 2008 with the onset of the crash, however, while the unemployment rate 
56 Knight, Ben. '"Hartz Reforms': How a Benefits Shakeup Changed Germany."Theguardian.com. 
Guardian News and Media, 01 Jan. 2013. Web. 20 Mar. 2014. 
<http:/ /www.theguardian.com/comr«entisfree/2013/jan/01/germany-hartz-reforms-inequality>. 
57 Dillon, Conor. "German Agenda 2010 Reforms 'mythical' Status Questioned I Germany I DW.DE I 
03.02.2014." DW.DE. Deutsche Welle, 03 Feb. 7.014. Web.19 Mar. 2014. <http://www.dw.de/german-
agenda-2010-reforms-myth ica 1-status-q uestioned/ a-17 406193>. 
58 Ibid 
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began to decrease again in 2009, GDP growth hit -6.8% that year anddidnotbegin to 
recover until a year later59• Furthermore, the GDP growth that emerged-as of2010 was 
remarkably high at around 4.3%60. After this point, GDP growth decreased slightly only 
to jump up to 5.2% in the first half of 2011. Real GDP annual growth rate then fell 
steadily and has not as yet increased past 1.8%61 • These numbers and their timing 
suggest that the quick recovery was caused by a factor other than economic reforms. 
Looking at how these reforms and economic indicators compare to those of 
France, we find a great discrepancy in the timing of reforms as well as in both 
unemployment rates and inequality. Most of Germany's major reforms took place prior 
to the Emozone crisis in 2008. France on the other hand held-off on reforms 1mtil after 
the crisis began. A chief reason for why is the relative economic prosperity and 
competitiveness that France enjoyed dming the early 2000s. From 2000 through to the 
end of/005 Germany's unemoloyment rate was significantly hip,her than that of France. 
The French rate stayed largely under 9% till2005, while the German rate, as was 
discussed above, averaged over 10% from roughly 2003 to 2005. Although the French 
rate continued to increase it stayed under the slowly decreasing German rate until late 
2009 when the two rates passed each other with the German continuing to decrease and 
the French continuing to increase to its current position of over 10%62 • 
We can also look at the differences in real GDP growth in both states. France's 
growth rates remained around 3.5% during the late 1990s and early 2000s reaching its 
59 
"Germany GDP Annual Growth Rate." TRADING ECONOMICS. Trading Economics, 2013. Web. 13 Mar. 
2014. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/germany/gdp-growth-annual>. 
60 Ibid 
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"France:Unemployment Rate." TRADING ECONOMICS. Trading Economics, 2013. Web.13.Mar. 2014. < 
http://www. tradingecon om ics.co m/fra nce/u nem ploym ent -rate>. 
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peak of about 4.5% in late 2000- and slowly .decreasing down to just 1mder I% at the start 
of2002. After this point, the rate generally improved staying around 4% until2009 when 
it reached a low of -4%. More currently it began slowly to improve reaching a high of 
2.8% in early 2011 and then decreased to negativ~ tenths of a percent in-early 2013 and 
then rising again later that year to a high of0.8%63 . Now these annual growth rates 
compare to those of Germany in that France had higher GDP growth from 2002 till early 
2008 at which point German growth surpassed that of France. French growth rates 
surpassed German during 2009 and maintained predominance till201 0 when German 
growth spiked and since 201 0 Germany has generally had higher growth rates64 From 
this data we can understand that one of the reasons that France did not begin to 
implement far reaching economic reforms until after the 2008 crisis is because it didn't 
need to. Its unemployment rate was within reasonable levels and it had a fairly steady 
and prosperous growth rate. France was thus not forced to reform as Gf'xmany-.Was. 
These numbers also show an intriguing difference in steadiness of growth, whereby the 
German rates are perpetually spiking up and down while the French remain steady, and 
they show that France actually began to recover growth faster than Germany did. The 
French economy began to grow again in 2009, exceeding Germany's growth. However 
yet again 201 0 changed this situation showing Germany surpassing France and 
maintaining greater economic growth into the present. 
Once the crisis had occurred and reform was necessary, President Nicolas 
Sarkozy implemented a €26 billion or $32.9 billion stimulus plan in 2009 that focused on 
63 
"France GDP Growth Rate." TRADING ECONOMICS. Trading Economics, 2013. Web. 13 Mar. 2014. 
<http://www. trad ingeconom ics.com/fran ce/ gd p-growth>. 
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investment programs65. The programs being aided were largely those that sought to 
build-up domestic industries, fund state-owned industries like rail, energy and postal 
companies, build up infrastructure, and encourage research and development. Yet 
another reform policy from roughly the same period promised €11.5 billion iii credits and 
tax breaks to companies that went forward on investment plans in 200966. Still other 
reforms have been made to France's tax laws starting with Sarkozy's 2007 changes to the 
Inheritance Tax so as to make it less costly for close family members to inherit from the 
deceased, and his introduction of the TEPA Law removed all taxes on overtime work in 
the hopes of fostering a desire to work more hours67. These reforms and other tax 
reforms passed with them, largely benefited the wealthiest segment of French society and 
anwunted to around €13.8 billion in cuts68 • However, these reforms were. undone in 2012 
by Sarkozy's successor, President Francois Hollande, who raised taxes amounting to 
nearly €7 .?. billion on the weaJthiest households, banks and big businesses6:., The taxes to 
be raised were primarily the Inheritance and Wealth Taxes and these came along side 
new taxes aimed at bank profits, dividends, stock options, bonuses, big businesses and 
energy companies 70• These reforms are designed to increase tax revenues and decrease 
France's staggering public debt by forcing the wealthy to shoulder more of the burden. 
65 
"Sarkozy Outlines a €26 Billion French Stimulus Plan." The New York Times: Business. The New York 
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They are also in line with the French orientation towards using laws and government 
resources to force equality and· limit wide wage gaps like that which has formed in 
Germany as was discussed above. 
30 ~ ... 
In the end we find that the major differences between French and German policy 
reforms aTe context, timing, and orientation. Germany implemented its reforms earlier 
than France and the French reforms strove to maintain economic equality. Conversely in 
maldng their social programs system more economical the German reforms managed to 
create greater inequalities between the different economic classes. Thus we can conclude 
that the differences between the policies implemented in either case are important, 
however as was discussed briefly in regards to the GDP growth rate statistics above these 
do not seem to be the only factors. It seems that something happened in 2010 that was 
unique to the German economy and caused a strong and relatively sustained spike in its 
growth. Therefore, based on the readings and analysis above we will pursue.soriie other 
potential factors namely the role of policy orientation, regional status, the identity of 
major export partners and the amount of investment in the economy. 
iii. A Question of Policy Orientation 
What role policy orientation may have played in the differing economic success 
of Germany and France during the Eurozone Crisis ties strongly with the other two 
factors, which we have already been discussing. Likewise this factor also has a strong 
historical element, for if it were not for Germany's poor economic performance in the 
late 90's and early 2000's it is possible that it would have had a different policy 
orientation. However, as Smith argued, Germany has focused increasingly since the 90's 
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on its·own national interests over those of,the Union. This has led poli~y.makers to see 
social and economic developments as congruous to one another and to reform their 
economy to make it competitive in the global market and not just the regional. 
Germany's practices have thus led to a balanced budget and little public rlebt. France on 
the other hand looked to the single market and trade in Europe while dividing economic 
and social development from one another. These.policies have mr-ant staggering public 
debt as the French government has been unwilling to sacrifice its social programs and 
welfare state for the sake of economic growth. The true price of a wholly Euro-centric 
policy orientation is that once the economies of Europe begin to fall apart they take all of 
the other countries in the region with them. This was the case of France whose major 
trade and economic policy prufuers were its fellow Eurozone members. Thus when 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece began to crumble the French lost acsizable 
ammmt of their export profits and were required to expend still more r.R-pital j.n order to 
help bail out these states so as to save their own interests. Thus in addition to increasing 
public debt from trying to save their own businesses, banks and social programs they 
have also been trying to take on the burden of the rest of the Eurozone. This is not the 
case for Germany largely because of the reforms and export orientation; which has 
already been discussed in earlier sections. Germany has contributed along with France in 
the bailing out of Europe, but it did so from a place of power and relative stability71 .. It 
has also helped states, particularly Greece, so as to ensure the. perpetuation of the 
Eurozone as an economic entity that Germany hopes to use as a destination for its exports 
and over which it hopes to propagate more power and authority. 
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"Greece: Merkel and Sarkozy Urge Greek Aid." BBC News. BBC, J.7 June 201LWeb. 10 Mar. 2014. 
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Regarding Dobrescu and Ciocea' s View that the Eurozone institutions were 
designed with the intention oflimiting German economic and political growth, we find 
no evidence to support it. Though this theory does support the general claim that other 
member states like France focused on beefing up the Union instead of on their own 
economic development, this seems to be more logically a result of the fact that other 
states had less cause to make changes prior to 2008. Likewise as was stated by Smith 
Germany tried to focus on development through the auspices of the Union during the late 
90's and early 2000's. It was only when these policy ideas met with opposition from 
other countries, like France, that Germany began to go its own way and focus more · 
nati<,mally. It also seems more logical to conclude that it was more ignoring, not focusing 
on Gemmny, that has led to these divergent policy orientations. 
iv. Regional Status 
The discussion of policy orientation likewise ties into our next factor, that of 
regional status. Herein we describe regional status as the place and power of a given 
country within the Eurozone and European Union. For Germany their regional status has 
historically been complicated. Their industrial policies; which include the mild 
protection of some key industries and a fDcus on making sure all sectors are efficient and 
market competitive; have been largeiy overlooked as Smith said due to the countries poor 
economic showing during the period when Union's own policies were being written. 
However, Germany has always been the model for the Eurozone's financial sector. As 
such it has steadily gained power over the Eurozone' s financial institutions and ultimately 
over the Union itself. We see this in Smith's analysis when he points to the fact that 
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Germany made its joining of the EU contingent on its fmancial institutions following the 
anti-·inflation, highly independent model of the GemJan National Banlc .Germany also 
asked for something that is relatively unprecedented and this was that the European 
Central bank be stationed not in Brussels at the heart of the EU but in the German city of 
Frankfurt. This seemed intended to serve as a declaration of German authority and it 
appears to have worked as such. Fiscal policy decisions have become increasingly 
decided by German politicians as Smith says, though it is likely a result of the fact that 
Germany is presently one of the EU's most successful states and any EU policy decision 
regarding, particularly the bailing out of troubled states, will directly affect the German 
people the most. Additionally, the German economic success has in many eyes proven 
its monetary, financial and even industrial policies to be valid, therefore other countries 
are more willing to accept the German view on policy matters. France on the other hand 
lacks this special control over the Unions financial institutions and due to its support of 
now delegitimized economic policies, and its own staggering public debt, its views on 
how to fix the Union are not seen to carry as much weight. 
v. Major Export Partners 72 
As was briefly addressed in the section on policy orientation, the recipients of a 
state's goods are an important factor in the success or failure of an economy, particularly 
if that economy is export oriented. We have already addressed the factthat both France 
and Germany are large export economies, so the question remains where do they export 
their goods to. As of2012 Germany exported 10.2% of its goods to France,'/% to the 
72 Technical assistance for graphical materials in this section were provided by Brian Rakovitis, Graduate 
Assistant in the EMU Political Science Department. 
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United Kingdom, 6.9% to the Netherlands, 6.3% to the United States, 5.6% to Austria, 
5.4% tn Italy, and 5.1% to China73. France on the other hand exported 16.'/% ofits goods 
to Germany, 7.5% each, to Belgium and Italy, 6.9% each, to Spain and the UK, 5.6% to 
the US and 4.3% to the Netherlands74. This data shows just how Europe-oriented the 
French economy-is, for of the top seven destinations for French exports six are member 
of the EU and five of those are members of the Eurozone specially 75 . In contrast, the data 
also shows how diversified Germany's export partners are in comparison to France. Of 
Germany's top seven export destination countries only five are member of the EU and 
four are members of the Eurozone. 
Now we will look more closely at trade with large economies outside of the EU, 
namely the US and China. These two states will be examined due to the US status as a 
major trading partner of both France and Germany and China's status as one of the 
largest t'conomies on the planet, whose significance is thoroughly .expressed in.both 
Phillips and Dobrescu and Ciocea's works. What we see when we focus on these two 
countries in particular is telling. Looking at the US we see that though both France and 
Germany trade with the US, Germany exports more than France amounting to a 
difference of0.7%. Although this percentage sounds small, given the size of the 
economies of France and Germany it equals several billion dollars. We can also compare 
the ranking of the US for both countries. The US is Gem1any's fourth largest trading 
partner as compared to France for whom the US ranks sixth. An examination of trade 
with China is also both interesting and easy to analyze, for Germany ranks China as their 
73 11 France vs. Germany. 111ndexmundi. lndexmundi, 2013. Web. 14 Apr. 2014. 
<http:/ /www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/france.germany/economy>. 
74 1bid 
75 The United Kingdom is not a member of the Eurozone. 
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seventh most important trade partner, while for France China doesn't even rank in the top 
seven. 
Looking at the data above as well as that on GDP growth from the section on 
policy reform, we find that, as was addressed by Parello-Plesner and Kundnani, trade 
with China has played a crucial role in the success of the German economy. As Figure 
1.1 shows, growth in German trade with China began to pick up nearly as soon as the 
economic crisis hit the Eurozone. 
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Figure 1.1: The amount of German exports to select countries as a percentage of 
Germany's GDP from 2001 to 201176• 
In the span of a single year, 2008-2009, German trade with China jumped 1.53% and 
continued to grow, "while the US and UK, Germany's traditional trading partners', fell 
steadily. This pattern continued until 2011 when German exports to China actually 
76 
"Export Destinations of Germany." The Observatory of Economic Complexity. Macro Connections: The 
~IT Media Lab, 2012. Web. 10 Mar. 2014. 
<http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/export/deu/show/all/2011/>. 
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exceeded German exports to the UK. I construe that the reason that Germany was able to 
overtake France by way ofGDP growth in 2010 was because of increased trade with 
China resulting from the signing of a comprehensive trade deal at the start of that year. 
France on the other hand has not benefited nearly as much from trade with China, for, 
although Figure 1.2 shows that French exports to China have also increased since 2008, 
the increase has been small and slow. 
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Figure 1.2: The change in French exports to select countries as a percentage of France's 
GDP from 2001 to 201177• 
Germany chose to diversity its export partners to other regions as a part of its 
policy goal of making Germany globally competitive, perhaps also they feared depending 
on Europe for their economic development Regardless of the reason for such 
diversification the result is apparent Germany's greater trade with countries like the US 
and China allowed it to recover more quickly than most Eurozone states as well as to 
77 11Export Destinations of France. 11 The Observatory of Economic Complexity. Macro Connections: The MIT 
Media Lab, 2012. Web. 10 Mar. 2014. 
<http i/ /atlas.med ia.m it.ed u/ explore/tree ... m ap/hs/ export/fra/show I a 11/2011/>. 
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achieve a 4% GDP growth rate only one year after having -6.8% growth. As we can see 
in Figure's 1.1 and 1.2 trade with the US has also become less important since the start of 
the financial crisis due to the fact that the crisis started in the US. However, as Phillips 
said developing states like China and Russia were not as significantly impacted by the 
crisis in the Western developed states and as such trade with such developing states was 
highly profitable as the case of Germany shows. Trade with Russia did not increase to 
the same degree that trade with China did, but Figure's 1.1 and 1.2 do show that it 
increased during much the same period. 
vi. Capital Flows 
The flow of investment from Germany to the smaller Eurozone states, and back, 
is our last significant factor. As Jeremias argues minimal government regulation in small 
Eurozone countries meant that prior to the crisis investment flowed into these countries 
and out of countries like Germany with higher government regulation. In 2006 alone the 
German National Bank calculates that €175.474 billion flowed out of Germany and this 
amount was on track to increase, however by 20 10 capital flow had decreased to roughly 
€131.361 billion78. Regarding flow from Germany to Ireland in particular, capital flow 
rose from €10.521 billion to €76.305 billion between 2005 and 200879 . This trend slowed 
in 2009 and by 2010 it had reversed direction completely so that €99.684 billion flowed 
from Ireland to Germany80. The trend in capital flow out of highly regulated cotmtries 
like Germany reversed around 2010 because the smaller less regulated economies were 
78 Jeremias, Ralf. "Germany And Ireland Unemployment Compared, Or Why Germany Profited From The 
World Economic Crisis." WorkingUSA 15.2 (2012): 233-65. Wiley Online Library. Web. 12 Feb. 2014. 
79 1bid 
80 Ibid 
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crashing and thus were no longer stable enough to be profitable. As a result companies 
started investing in the higher regulated but notably more stable states like Germany. 
This helped Germany recover and prosper after the crisis because, instead of being 
shipped abroad, capital was being invested domestically particularly into research and 
development. Research and development is noted for its ability to create jobs and by so 
doing decrease the unemployment rate, and we do see in 2010 the beginning of a period 
of unemployment rate decline, which has continued to the present81 . Although it seems 
plain that the flow of capital from smaller states was an important factor in Germany's 
growth there is no evidence to suggest whether this was also true for France. 
VI. Conclusions regarding Germany's success and thoughts on the future of the 
European Union 
It is an uncontestable fact that the German economy has done well in the face of 
the Eurozone financial crisis. After analyzing this situation we find that the credit for 
Germany's success is due to more than just their focus on an export-manufacturing 
development model or policy reforms. Thus we find that our hypothesis that Germany's 
success stemmed from its reliance on exports and the issuance of unique policy reforms is 
both right and wrong, for although, these factors are significant, it is the factors that 
played into them that have donned the greatest role. These additional factors are the 
orientation of policies towards national or regional concerns, the status and subsequent 
power a state holds within the region, the countries with whom the country trades and the 
81 
"Germany:Unemployment Rate." TRADING ECONOMICS. Trading Economics, 2013. Web.13 Mar. 2014.< 
http://www. tradingeconom ics.co m/ germ any I u n employment -rate>. 
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amount of investment capital flow being received by the state. Of particular importance 
in this crisis is trade with the large developing and prospering country of China. 
China's relationship with Germany and the EU states in general poses the greatest 
threat to the future independence and unity of the EU. This stems from the concern that 
the EU's largest economies will become so dependent on the Chinese economy that it 
becomes China and not the EU member states who are calling the shots regarding foreign 
and economic policy. Although at present the majority of the Eurozone's citizens wish to 
maintain the economic union there is the possibility that, if this crisis does not end soon, 
countries like Germany will cut their losses, leave the Union and perhaps create a new 
economic union with a more selective and economically stable membership. This would 
lead to the consequent disintegration of the Union. There are also concerns that policy 
differences between Germany and France will lead to the Eurozone's destruction, for as 
has been discussed in the analysis above, these two countries have long disagreed on how 
to run and design the Unions fiscal, industrial, and monetary institutions. These 
differences have already lead Germany to separate from mainstream Europe, an act 
which ironically saved them from the same economic ruin, however there remains a 
potential that with the added strain of economic crisis and the German people growing 
increasingly weary of bailing out the southern Eurozone states, particularly Greece, these 
divisions may become irreconcilable. There is also the potential that the future of the 
Eurozone will be one solely dominated by Germany, where the Euro would amount to a 
new 'Euro-mark'. With Germany growing in its authority over the Union's fmancial 
institutions this seems relatively likely. Then there is the question of what would happen 
if the Chinese economy were to faulter, fail, or significantly reorder itself. 2012 saw the 
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beginnings of an economic slowdown in China with growth dropping closer to 8%, the 
lowest since the late 90's82. If China continues to slow significantly and likewise if its 
goverrunent' s reforms orient towards increasing reliance on its domestic market instead 
of on imports, then the effect could be that Germany will plununet into yet another~ 
economic crisis and this crisis would likely be worse than they faced in the early 2000s. 
With China no longer available to save the German economy or the economies of other 
export dependent states the result could be the perpetuation of the Eurozone crisis or 
another recession. What seems certain is that regardless of what happens to the Union 
itself, without China as a major trade partner, Germany would lose much of the power it 
has gained in the Union over the last six years. 
For the future I believe it would be best to further track each of these factors. It 
would be particularly prudent to examine German-China relations and the burgeoning 
EU-China relations in greater depth going forward. Ifpossihle the~flow of capital to and 
from France should also be examined and subsequently compared to that of Germany. It 
would also be wise to look at how the smaller economies like Ireland that were the frrst to 
fall victim to the crisis are doing today, and how this compares to the progress of 
Germany and France. Another fascinating new element to this discussion would be to 
look at how the situation in the Ukraine and the renewed strain in relations with Russia, 
which is also a close ally of China, will affect the future of the EU and its economic 
recovery. However, at the present the only conclusion that can be made about the future 
of Germany, the European Union and the Eurozone is that for now, and barring any new 
82 LeVine, Steve. "China's Great Slowdown Is Really Here-and It's Worse Than You Think." The Atlantic. 
Atlantic Media Company, 27 Sept. 2012. Web. 06 Feb. 2014. 
<http://www. theatlantic. com/business/ arch ive/2012 
/09/chinas~great-slowdown~is-really-here-and-its-worse-than-you-think/262971/>. 
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unforeseen catastrophe, it is likely that all three will continue to hold themselves together 
and work towards a more prosperous, though perhaps less united future. 
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